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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Appellees accept Appellants' statement of jurisdiction as accurate. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Is "mutual mistake" a proper basis for equitable recision of a contract? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law that is subject to de novo 
review. Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) 
2. Were the findings of fact made by the trial court clearly erroneous, in light 
of the evidence presented at trial? 
Standard of Review: Issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a trial court's factual findings and the adequacy of those findings are 
reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. All 
Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah App. 2001) 
3. Did the trial court properly address and rule upon all the material issues of 
fact that were presented in the case? 
Standard of Review: Issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a trial court's factual findings and the adequacy of those findings are 
reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. All 
Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah App. 2001) 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are not statutory provisions that are determinative of the issues in this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
This case was commenced by the filing of a Complaint by Kendall 
InsuMiii t! 11K ' il 111 h'v Aiiii Morgan, (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Morgans") on February 24, 2004. On March 24, 2004, R&R Group 
and Rick Stanzione (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sellers") filed their 
Answt'i ,iii(l (iiiiinlt'ii.knin I oceeding, Sellers pursued 
orders to show cause in April 2004, and in April 2005. An order relating to 
proceedings on the first order to show cause was entered on August 9, 2004. 
Issues raise v cause were merged with all other I 
issues and considered by the court at a trial conducted on October 31 and 
November 1,2005. 
owing the trial, . iciings of hau . conclusions of 
Law, and also its Final Order and Judgment herein on February 27, 2006. On 
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May 26, 2006, Sellers filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By its Memorandum Decision dated 
August 2, 2006, the trial court denied the motion. 
Statement of Facts 
This case involves a contract for the sale of an insurance agency "book of 
business", which sale was negotiated between Morgans, as purchasers, and 
Sellers, as sellers, and memorialized by a written contract dated on or about 
August 26, 2003. (Record at 30). During the negotiations leading up to the 
execution of the contract, Sellers made representations to Morgans regarding the 
number and nature of ongoing clients and insurance policies which were being 
serviced by the business, and also relating to the value of the "book of business" 
which was purportedly being transferred by the contract. (Trial Transcript at 35 
and 39-40). The particular book of business which was the subject of the 
negotiations was the book of business of the Kendall Insurance Agency, which 
business had been acquired by Sellers approximately seventeen months earlier. 
(Trial Transcript at 337). 
At the time the Kendall Insurance Agency was originally acquired by 
Sellers, all records and accounting information of the agency were maintained in 
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the form of non-automated paper records, ledgers, etc. (Trial Transcript at 32). 
Between the time of Sellers' original acquisition of the Kendall Insurance Agency 
and the negotiated transfer to Morgans, Sellers had undertaken the process of 
converting all records and accounting information of the agency to an automated 
format. (Trial Transcript at 38-39 and 334-336). During the period of negotiation 
of the contract, Sellers represented that the conversion of the agency records to 
an automated format had been completed, and that the summarized business 
and accounting information provided by Sellers to Morgans during the negotiation 
of the contract were accurate. (Trial Transcript at 39). 
In fact, at the time of the contract, the automation of the agency business 
records and accounting information had not been completed, and the information 
provided by Sellers to Morgans did not accurately reflect either the nature or 
value of the book of business being transferred. (Trial Transcript at 48-50 and 73-
74). Upon execution of the contract, Morgans paid their initial down payment of 
at least $75,000 toward the purchase price. (Trial Transcript at 127-128 and Trial 
Exhibits 12 and 13). Thereafter Morgans made additional advances to the 
business in amounts in excess of $42,000.00. (Trial Exhibits 12 and 13). 
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Shortly after undertaking operation of the insurance agency, Morgans 
discovered significant discrepancies between the information they had received 
and the actual customers and policies which were being serviced by the agency. 
(Trial Transcript at 48-50 and 73-74J. The magnitude of the errors in the 
information was that approximately forty to fifty percent of the customers and 
policies which were reflected in the business records received by Morgans were 
not accurate and had been either discontinued or otherwise terminated. (Trial 
Transcript at 49 and 73-74). 
Upon discovering the significant discrepancies in the business information, 
Morgans requested a reformation of the contract. (Trial Transcript at 128). This 
request was denied by Sellers. (Trial Transcript at 128 and 130). As a result of 
such denial, the present complaint was filed by Morgans in February 2004. 
(Record at 1). In their response to the complaint, Sellers asserted several 
alternative defenses, including an affirmative request for return of the insurance 
agency to Sellers. (Record at 22 and 27). Thereafter, in April 2004, after an 
attempted self-help recovery of the business by Sellers was unsuccessful, Sellers 
sought and obtained an order to show cause, the focus of which was an effort by 
Sellers to obtain complete control over the disputed insurance agency and its 
5 
assets. (Record at 46). At the conclusion of the hearing on the order to show 
cause, the court ruled that the agency and its assets should be returned to the 
control of Sellers, which ruling was memorialized in the court's formal order 
entered on or about August 9, 2004. (Record at 101). 
Following entry of the court's order on August 9, 2004, Morgans took steps 
to return to Sellers all assets and information relating to the originally- transferred 
insurance agency. (Trial Transcript at 102-108). At the same time, Morgans 
attempted to maintain their own independent agency based upon clients and 
policies which were not associated with the Kendall Insurance Agency being 
returned to Sellers. (Trial Transcript at 121-122). Disputes over the return of 
Kendall Insurance Agency information and assets continued from August 2004 
through approximately April 2005, at which time Sellers sought a second order to 
show cause relating to the return of the agency information. (Record at 125). 
As indicated in the procedural history, above, issues raised in this second 
Order to Show Cause were merged with all trial issues and tried before the court 
on October 31 and November 1, 2005. Both parties acknowledge that the 
continuing disputes had a negative impact on the value of the insurance agency 
book of business that was the subject of the original contract. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The essence of the present appeal is Sellers' dissatisfaction with the 
consequences of a result which they, themselves, sought. The court's ruling that 
the underlying contract between the parties should be rescinded is supported by 
the trial court's finding of a mutual mistake as to material facts at the time the 
contract was negotiated. Controlling case law in the State of Utah recognizes 
mutual mistake as a proper basis for equitable recision of a contract, even when 
that contract may appear on its face to be an integrated agreement. 
Much of the impetus for the trial court's ultimate decision to rescind the 
contract, as a matter of equity, was provided by the aggressive efforts of Sellers, 
themselves, to recover and control the insurance agency business and its assets. 
Sellers were ultimately successful, through the court's recision order, in regaining 
ownership and control of the insurance agency book of business and related 
assets. However, Sellers are dissatisfied with the result to the extent that it also 
places Morgans, as nearly as possible, into their pre-contract position by 
requiring the return of $75,000 of the payments made by Morgans to Sellers at 
the initiation of the contract. 
Accordingly, Sellers challenge the adequacy of the trial court's findings that 
support the equitable recision result. While acknowledging that a challenge to 
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the trial court's factual findings must be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" or 
"abuse of discretion" standard, Sellers fail to meet that standard. Rather than 
marshaling all of the available evidence which may support the court's findings 
and then analyzing that evidence to demonstrate flaws in the court's analysis, 
Sellers cite only those portions of the factual record which support an alternative 
version of the facts. This method of argument is inappropriate in the present 
appeal and fails to meet Sellers' burden in challenging the trial court's findings. 
Arguments opposing the court's imposition of limits on the amount of 
attorneys fees which may be awarded to Sellers in the case, and additional 
challenges to the court's denial of Sellers' request for relief under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contain no factual support upon which the 
court of appeals could conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in such 
determinations. Further, Sellers' failure to timely request the allowance of any 
attorneys fees in this case and their similar failure to seek any stay pending 
appeal render these issues moot in the present appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RECISION OF THE CONTRACT WAS AN APPROPRIATE RESULT IN 
THIS CASE. 
A. Mutual Mistake is a Proper Basis for Equitable Recision of a 
Contract 
The initial argument made in Sellers' brief, at pages 10 through 12, is that 
"mutual mistake" cannot, as a matter of law, support the equitable recision of an 
integrated contract. Sellers' references to the case of Maack v. Resource Design 
& Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994), are not correct in their 
suggestion that only "positive fraud" can support the equitable recision of an 
integrated contract. The court's analysis in the Maack case includes a discussion 
of the parole evidence rule as it relates to the admissibility of evidence relating to 
contract formation issues, and quotes the Utah Supreme Court decision of Union 
Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), as follows: 
The parole evidence rule as a principle of contract 
interpretation has a very narrow application. Simply stated, the rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations offered for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.. 
This general rule as stated contains an exception for fraud. 
Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which 
the contract was made or the purpose for which the writing was 
executed. This is so even after the writing is determined to be an 
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence in such circumstances 
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avoids the judicial enforcement of a writing that appears to be a 
binding integration but in fact is not. 
"What appears to be a complete and binding integrated 
agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement 
without consideration, or it may be voidable for fraud, duress, 
mistake, or the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidation causes 
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing." 
Maack v. Resource Design. 875 P. 2d at 575, quoting from Union Bank v. 
Swenson. 707 P. 2d at 665 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. 
c(1981)). 
Recision of a contract is an equitable remedy, the effect of which is to 
return both parties to the contract, as nearly as possible, to the positions they 
were in prior to the execution of the purported contract. Perry v. Woodall. 438 
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968). The ruling of the court in the present case, that the 
contract at issue should be equitably rescinded as a result of a mutual mistake of 
fact relating to the nature and value of the underlying insurance agency book of 
business, is consistent with the decision of courts in this state which have 
addressed the issue of equitable recision. "A mutual mistake occurs when both 
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic 
assumption or vital fact upon which they base their bargain." Robert Langston. 
Ltd. v. McQuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1987). "Mutual mistake of fact 
makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable recision." ]o\ (citing 
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Tanner v. District Judges. 649 P. 2d 5, 6 (Utah 1982); Tarrant v. Monson. 619 P. 
2d 1210, 1211 (Nev. 1980)). 
In the present case, as properly found by the district court, the parties 
shared a misconception as to the nature and value of the book of business which 
was the subject of the purchase contract. The misconception related directly to 
the valuation of the book of business, and was confirmed by evidence presented 
to the court, including testimony which indicated that the financial and business 
records of the company were undergoing a process of automation that rendered 
the reports relied upon during the contract negotiations grossly inaccurate. 
Shortly after the Morgans undertook operation of the insurance agency, they 
discovered the significant inaccuracies in the books and records which had been 
provided to them, and ultimately determined that the book of business which they 
received was substantially less, both in size and value, than was contemplated by 
both parties at the time the contract was entered into. 
B. Effective Recision of the Contract was Sought by Sellers 
At the inception of the litigation, and consistently throughout the 
proceedings in the trial court, Sellers aggressively asserted the right to recover 
and control the business operations and assets of the agency which had 
purportedly been sold. These efforts, which included an affirmative request in 
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Appellant's counterclaim for recovery of the business, and also two orders to 
show cause whereby Sellers sought to recover complete control over the 
business and its assets, are consistent with a recision of the contract, but are not 
consistent with the presently-stated desire of Sellers to enforce the terms of the 
contract, as written. 
Sellers' dissatisfaction with the result ordered by the court, and particularly 
the refunding to Morgans of the initial purchase price paid toward the acquisition 
of the book of business, is based more upon a misunderstanding of the effect of a 
recision than it is on any suggestion that Sellers did not seek a recision of the 
contract in this case. 
Contrary to the position maintained by Sellers throughout the litigation, the 
argument contained in their present brief is that "this Court should grant 
Stanzione's request for relief below by enforcing the contractual terms requiring 
the Morgans to finish making payments for Kendall Insurance and by requiring 
Stanzione to return Kendall Insurance to the Morgans." (see Appellant's Opening 
Brief at page 12). By advancing, on appeal, the position that the court should 
now require Sellers to return ownership and control of the insurance agency to 
Morgans, Sellers are attempting to disavow the principal positions maintained in 
the trial court. This can be explained by Sellers' present realization that the 
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recision which they sought did not provide the financial result which they had 
hoped for. 
C. The Court's Findings and Conclusions are Sufficient to Support 
Recision of the Contract 
As set forth in Robert Lanqston Ltd. v. McQuarrie. the existence of a 
mutual mistake of fact makes a contract voidable, and is sufficient to support 
equitable recision. 741 P2d. at 557. In its findings and conclusions herein, the 
trial court did specifically find a mutual mistake of fact, which finding has factual 
support in the record, thereby providing a sufficient basis for the equitable 
recision ordered. Defendant does not dispute that a finding of "mutual mistake" 
was made, but challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding, 
which challenge will be addressed further, below. 
D. The Award of a Money Judgment to Morgans and Recovery and 
Retention of the Business by Sellers are Consistent with Recision. 
When the remedy of equitable recision is applied, the further role of the 
court is to craft the specific remedial steps that should be taken to return the 
parties, as nearly as possible, to the position that they were in before the contract 
was entered into. ]a\ In the present case the court appropriately, and consistent 
with Sellers' requests, returned to Sellers all assets and business operations 
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relating to the subject book of business. This effectively returned Sellers to the 
position they were in prior to execution of the contract. 
In order to return Morgans, as nearly as possible, to the position they were 
in prior to the execution of the contract, and consistent with Robert Lanqston Ltd. 
v. McQuarrie. the court required that $75,000.00 from the original down payment 
paid by Morgans be returned to them. It is significant that Sellers have not 
challenged the court's determination of the amount to be repaid to Morgans but, 
instead, only argue that the consequence of recision of the contract which 
requires repayment to Morgans is not a proper result. 
II. SELLERS' CHALLENGES TO THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT 
PROPERLY SUPPORTED. 
A. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Review with Respect to 
Challenged Findings of Fact Has Not Been Met. 
Throughout their opening brief, Sellers take issue with the findings of the 
trial court. While acknowledging that the appellate standard for review of factual 
findings made by a trial court is a very high "abuse of discretion" or "clearly 
erroneous" standard, the substance of Sellers' argument goes only so far as to 
suggest that the evidence presented during the trial in this matter may, if viewed 
differently and given different weight by the trial court, have justified a different 
conclusion. Sellers are essentially arguing that the appellate court should review 
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the evidence itself, particularly the evidence which is more favorable to the 
Sellers' position, and reverse the trial court's findings based upon that review. 
This is not the role or function of an appellate court, and is inconsistent with the 
requirement that, on appeal, the findings of the trial court should not be modified 
or reversed absent a showing of "abuse of discretion." State v. All Real Property. 
37 P. 3d at 278. 
Much of Sellers' argument is based upon the testimony of David Kano, and 
the suggestion that such testimony confirms that the book of business did have 
the value represented by Sellers. Mr. Kano's testimony, however, carries little 
weight in the overall analysis of the case as a result of several factors, all of 
which are confirmed in the trial record. These factors include the absence of any 
independent verification by Mr. Kano of the sources of the funds that were 
reflected on the statements he reviewed (Trial Transcript at 278-279 and 281-
282), the inclusion of significant premium payments that were generated by 
Morgans entirely independent of the Kendall Insurance book of business (Trial 
Transcript at 72, 130, and 161), the inclusion of funds advanced by Morgans to 
the insurance agency to cover operating shortfalls (Trial Exhibits 12 and 13), and 
the contribution of Paul Nelson's independent book of business into the agency 
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(Trial Transcript at 43). In light of these factors, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by giving little weight to Mr. Kano's testimony. 
B. Sellers have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Sufficiently to 
Challenge the Findings of the Trial Court 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, "A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Sellers have failed to marshal the fact evidence which 
supports the position they are challenging. The burden of proof lies with the party 
appealing the lower court decision. The challenging party must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the contested findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts and in light of the conflicting contradictory evidence the decision of the trial 
court is clearly erroneous. The Utah Court of Appeals has previously held that: 
Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must demonstrate to 
appellate courts first how the trial court found the facts from the 
evidence and second why such findings contradict the weight of the 
evidence. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 
(Utah App. 1994). In describing the responsibility of the challenger the court 
noted: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, 
the challenger must present in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
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the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding 
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added.) 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991). Sellers have failed to marshal the evidence in accordance with these 
decisions. 
III. THE COURT'S RULING PROPERLY ADDRESSES AND DISPOSES 
OF ALL FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
Contrary to Sellers' suggestions, the findings made by the trial court in this 
matter are sufficient in every respect. The fact that the court did not rule 
favorably on Sellers' requests for a finding of contempt and other sanctions, does 
not mean that the court failed to rule on the issues upon which such requests 
were based. The responsibility of the trial court is to make findings on the 
ultimate facts. "It is not necessary to make findings on the subsidiary or 
evidentiary facts." Duncan v. Hemmelwriqht. 186 P.2d 965, 112 Utah 262, 265 
(1947). The merger of the order to show cause into the trial issues rendered the 
order to show cause subsidiary to the overarching trial issues. Even so, the 
underlying issues which were the subject of the final order to show cause -
whether or not Morgans had returned the book of business and related assets to 
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Sellers, and whether Morgans had, by their actions and business conduct, 
attempted to circumvent the court's earlier order in a manner sufficient to support 
a finding of contempt - were specifically dealt with in the trial court findings. 
The specific findings made by the court which address these issues include 
the following: 
19. In his steps to reclaim the assets and operations of the Kendall 
Insurance Agency in 2004, Stanzione acted in a controlling an 
compulsive manner. 
* * * 
21. Through a motion filed with this court, Defendants' sought to 
obtain possession and operational control of the Kendall Agency and 
its assets. A hearing on Defendants' motion was conducted in late 
June 2004, at which time the court ordered the operational control of 
the Kendall Agency be returned to Defendants. The formal court 
order directing the return of the Kendall Agency to Defendants was 
entered in the above-entitled court on or about August 9, 2004. 
* * * 
23. The actions of both Plaintiffs and Defendants, including their 
communications with third parties, clients, and insurance agencies, 
were detrimental to and impaired the relationships which had been 
established previously through the operations of the Kendall Agency. 
24. All assets of the Kendall Agency have been returned and are 
presently controlled by Defendants. 
* * * 
26. The operations of the Kendall Agency have been terminated as 
a result of the incorporation of that business into the business of the 
R&R Group under the management of Stanzione." 
18 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the court herein and dated 
February 27, 2006, and included in Appellant's addendum of exhibits filed 
concurrently with Appellant's opening brief. 
The foregoing findings confirm both the actual return of the assets to Sellers 
and the mutual responsibility of both parties for confusion and negative impact 
upon the value of those assets. Such findings are entirely consistent with the 
court's not granting any additional relief based upon the order to show cause 
previously obtained at Sellers' request. 
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES ARE MOOT. 
In their arguments on appeal, Sellers allege error in the limitations imposed 
by the trial court on attorneys fees awarded to Sellers. This argument, however, 
must be overruled as a result of Sellers' failure to seek any award of attorneys 
fees in this case. In its ruling, the court specifically authorized an award of 
attorneys fees, but required that an application for such fees be submitted to the 
court, and subject to review and challenge by Morgans, within ten days after entry 
of the court's original order. While it is true that the court's order also imposes a 
limit on the attorneys fees which may be awarded to the sum of $17,500.00, no 
amount has ever actually been requested or awarded to Sellers consistent with 
the order of the trial court. Having failed to request an allowance of any fees, 
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Sellers have waived the right to recover such fees in this action, thereby rendering 
moot any question relating to such award of fees in the present appeal. 
V. ARGUMENTS REGARDING DENIAL OF THE RULE 60(b) MOTION 
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Following entry of the court's final order and judgment in this case, Sellers 
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 (b), which motion was ultimately denied by the 
court. Because Sellers' motion sought only procedural protection from the 
enforcement of the final judgment and order, it does not constitute a final and 
appealable order in the present case. Simply put, Sellers have not taken 
appropriate procedural steps to seek further protection from the enforcability of the 
court's judgment pending the outcome of the present appeal. Further, pursuing an 
appeal from the denial of such motion has no effect on the enforcability of the 
judgment, and also does nothing to change or enhance the arguments or positions 
which have otherwise been presented to the court for appellate review. 
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CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in the present 
case were based upon sufficient evidence, and were correctly applied to support 
the court's determinations that the contract between the parties be rescinded, and 
that a money judgment for return of the down payment be awarded to Morgans. 
Appellant's arguments relating to the limitation on any award of attorney fees have 
been rendered moot by Appellant's failure to seek allowance of any fees within the 
time period specified by the court. The decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this _ ^ ^ d a y of December, 2006. 
Noel S.Hyde 
Attorney for Morgans 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ f ^ a y of December, 2006,1 mailed two true 
and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, first-class 
postage prepaid, by United States Mail, to: 
Drew Briney, Esq. 
265 North Main Street, #100 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
JtWfy* 
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